Q&A: Israel, Iran and the Middle East uprisings

Y! Contributor Network, All the players in the Middle East are jockeying for position in the new order, even before that order is established. Iran is flexing its military muscle, Israel has lost its strongest ally in the Arab world, global oil prices are soaring, Libya is imploding, the United States may lose a strategic naval base, the remaining monarchs are looking over their shoulders and big oil is pulling in huge profits.

To help sort it all out, I spoke with Ross Brann, professor of Judeo-Islamic studies at Cornell University. In addition to having studied in both Israel and Egypt, Prof. Brann is also the former chair of Cornell's Department of Near Eastern Studies. The discussion was particularly focused on the strategic relationship between countries.

Let's start with Israel. What's the reaction to the Egyptian uprising there?

Prof. Brann: The current Israeli government is the most conservative government that Israel has had in its history. As such, its legitimacy is founded on its ongoing capacity to frame the most important issues facing the country as issues of security, whether they actually are or not. In the short run, the removal of the strong ally in Mubarak on Israel's southern border means the government has a lot to work with in terms of reframing the issues, as this [is an] over-riding security concern that almost all Israelis share. So, not only will it have the support of its natural allies on the very far right and the right, but it really captures the mood of the political center.

Is that "us or them" feeling universal among Israelis?
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Prof. Brann: Most Americans don't really get the news that there is an opposition in Israel that is opposed to the settlements in the West Bank and that would like to conclude a just, final status peace arrangement with the Palestinians. That group feels that it's precisely at this time, when Israel is going to be challenged on a number of different fronts politically, that the country should be redoubling its efforts to finalize an acceptable arrangement with the Palestinians because the plight of the Palestinians resonates so deeply in the region. That is not going to happen, but that's the view of the liberal left. They're making noise in Israel, but there's no indication that people outside of their circles are particularly listening. You can check up on this voice if you go to either Ha'aretz for the liberal voice and maybe Gush Shalom (they both have English language websites) for the slightly farther left view.

With uprisings going on in places like Bahrain and Yemen where there is a Shiite religious element to the uprising, is that more of a threat than the loss of Egypt as a strong ally, from Israel's perspective?

Prof. Brann: I don't really think so, because Yemen is very weak and a non-functioning state, and Bahrain is a small island. I do think that Prime Minister Netanyahu will point to them and say, "See, it's the hand of Iran." I think it serves his purposes, but with the exception of Hezbollah on Israel's north, there's no immediate Shia, I won't even use the word "threat," but opposition to the state of Israel along its borders. All of the other states are Sunni majority states with no Shia to speak of. Israeli fears are informed by memories of Jewish history, but that's not to say the politicians can't find ways to make them useful for their own purposes. It's that nuance that I'm trying to convey.

It doesn't seem as though it's going to take much effort to frame Iranian ships coming into the Mediterranean as a threat to the Israeli people.

Prof. Brann: That's true, that's a much easier case for Netanyahu to make, and I think no matter what kind of a transition government takes place in Egypt, and whatever the outcome of whatever kind of elections take place in six months or a year, Egypt will no longer be aligned with Israel in the same way, controlling the Palestinians in Gaza by maintaining closed borders and tolerating the status quo in Israel's general control over territory in which millions of Palestinians live with their own aspirations.

I'm quite certain that Egypt will continue to observe the peace treaty with Israel scrupulously, but that's a separate question from whether it's allied with Israel against Hamas in Gaza or against Iran. There already has been, by allowing those ships to go through the Suez Canal, a signaling to the rest of the world and the Middle East that Egypt's foreign policy is changing in that respect.

Foreign Minister Lieberman has said that Israel cannot ignore the provocation of Iranian ships in the Mediterranean. Can Israel risk any sort of military response to these ships at this time?

Prof. Brann: You are asking me to project what might or might not happen. My view is that Israel's room for unilateral actions has been reduced. Egypt gave it cover, implicit sanction for all of the kinds of unilateral actions it has taken militarily over the last years. So most people who look for signs of what might happen strategically, think that the likelihood of Israel trying to engage Iran has been reduced by the loss of its ally Egypt. It's basically the United States and Israel. [Israel] has kind of a tacit alliance with Saudi Arabia, but it's not spoken about. Egypt was really key.

On the one hand you would think they would be much more cautious because how do you game plan what the repercussions are going to be? On the other hand, some people in that government might be inclined to promote riskier behavior. There's another way of reading it, which I think is the right way. Lieberman wants to replace Netanyahu as prime minister and so he's put him in a tight spot by declaring, "Here is what I think Israel should do." So, now if Netanyahu doesn't, he looks weak. Lieberman has been trying, in various ways, to outmaneuver Netanyahu in their own coalition. So I think this is another dimension to the story, internal Israeli politics. He'd like nothing better than to replace Netanyahu as prime minister.

So those are the three possibilities. I favor the third, frankly, that this was his way of upping the ante in terms of his relationship with the person he nominally works for.

Regardless of current posturing, is Lieberman more hawkish than Netanyahu? Would his government be more aggressive?

Prof. Brann: Yes. I mean that's what he says anyway. He's been extremely provocative. He's not welcome in most capitals of the world. He's embarrassed a lot of the center of Israel. He loves to provoke. He insulted President Mubarak months ago, because he had not set foot in Israel except for the Rabin funeral. He insulted a Turkish ambassador. He insulted the Prime Minister of Turkey verbally. Some of the Israeli press calls him a "Russian thug" type, but that's Lieberman's modus operandi. He doesn't worry about what the consequences of his language might be. He has Netanyahu to pick up the pieces at the moment.

From their statements, it seems Iran would like nothing better than a military confrontation with Israel. How do you interpret Iran's public pronouncements?

Prof. Brann: I think it's comparable to some of Lieberman's rhetoric, in the sense that it's intentionally provocative. It's appealing to a certain audience and Iran has been strengthened strategically, both by events in Iraq, our invasion, and now by the collapse of an American ally, Mubarak. They don't have to do anything. They've been strategically strengthened. Plus, I would say the Supreme Leader's remarks are probably designed to deflect attention from the Iranian opposition which was in the streets for a couple of days and beaten back pretty severely by the government's forces.

All these things always have a domestic audience. There's a domestic message involved. There's frequently a regional message involved. A bilateral message might also be involved, but very often, the bilateral message, in this case Israel-Iran is the least important.

From an internal politics standpoint, is it more difficult to have an uprising in a country if there's an external threat?

Prof. Brann: Oh, certainly! I think on some level, this Iranian government would welcome some sort of military engagement with Israel, because the country will rally around the regime. That's the flag they're raising. If the Israelis are lured into to taking them up on that, it will only strengthen that regime rather than weaken it.

How does the uprising in Bahrain play into the tension?

Prof. Brann: Bahrain's uprising is purely internal to Bahrain. It's connected to other developments in the region in that it's an uprising. Disenchantment with rulers and with economy has spread. It has nothing to do with Israel's conflict with the Palestinians. In that respect, there's no bilateral part to it.

You don't see any Iranian influence in any of these uprisings?

Prof. Brann: Well, it's indirect. I think Iran is very pleased. I think it's probably giving whatever kind of support it can, but it certainly hasn't lit the match. That came from Tunisia to Egypt. Then, it went to Yemen and Libya and we've seen a little unrest in Morocco and in Jordan and now in Bahrain. Each of those countries faces a different set of internal political and economic issues. You're right that in Bahrain it's somewhat different because there's a Shia majority and a ruling Sunni elite and it's right there in the Persian Gulf so, yes, it does have other kinds of implications, but we need to be careful in talking about connecting uprisings in different countries, the particulars in each country may vary, and may vary considerably.

Saudi Arabia is of biggest concern to our economy. The King returned home from abroad Wednesday...

Prof. Brann: I believe the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Mike Mullen, was visiting the region. I know that he was in Jordan, and I believe that he was in Saudi Arabia obviously to reassure American allies that our about-face to Mubarak was a specifically Mubarak policy, and that our friends are still our friends in other places. I know our government is also quite concerned about Bahrain, far more so than the Israelis would be. It's just not an issue for Israel, but the American issue there is the naval base.

Do you see Saudi Arabia at risk at this point?

Prof. Brann: No. I just don't see that it's at risk. It's a very different kind of country than Egypt. Egypt is probably 85 million, 20 million living in Cairo with a very high percentage of educated young people between the ages of 18 and 30 who are unemployed or underemployed. It was a very specific kind of uprising. The social structure and socio-economic structure in Saudi Arabia are very different. It doesn't mean there aren't people who are disenchanted for one reason or another, but it's not the same situation as in Egypt. We shouldn't simply look at unrest or unhappiness in each country and presume that it represents exactly the same grievances.

Undoubtedly, Saudi Arabia is concerned about its own Shia populations in its eastern provinces where much of the oil is.

If you are a monarch or totalitarian regime in the Middle East who counts the United States as an ally, you have to be concerned, I would think. If, as the King of Saudi Arabia, the US is calling for freedom and democracy, I think maybe they don't want me here.

Prof. Brann: I'm sure they've given him all kinds of private reassurances and whether those will satisfy him or not, I'm not sure, but the call for more democracy is not a new one. We heard it under President Bush. We heard it under President Carter. I think we even heard it under President Reagan and the first President Bush. These are not new statements, but those were probably always given with reassurances that the US understands that you have some issues and please do it at your own pace and your own way, shape and form, but you're right, the context is changed and charged because of Egypt.

Isn't the message, if something should happen in one of these countries, or in your country, don't expect us to help you, because we didn't help Mubarak?

Prof. Brann: Yes, but the true test would be Saudi Arabia, because of the oil. I can't imagine any American government that would not engage in some kind of action if it were to believe that all that oil were about to fall into unfriendly hands. It's hard to conceive of any American government that would not see that as a strategic threat to the United States. So that's what I mean by private assurance to the House of Saud, that they're kind of in this together. I don't think the United States is prepared to let that happen.

Speaking of oil...

Prof. Brann: The other side of this is who has benefited from all this political upheaval in the short run? Aside from Iran, it's the oil companies. Gasoline is already going up, and there were reports a few days ago of the possibility of $5 gasoline by the summer. Libyan oil reserves have been shut off to the outside world. There are American and international profit takers seeing an opportunity in this destabilization. It's all part of this complex political economy we live in, but that won't get discussed. It will be explained as there's instability in the Middle East so, of course, the price of oil must rise.