Iran’s Nuclear Program Revived

The Iranian foreign minister announced on Thursday that the Russian-built reactor at Bushehr has reached critical mass and become operational. While there is a difference of opinion about the “immediate” threat from Bushehr, there is no denying that this is a symbolic victory for the Iranian nuclear program and a setback for the West in its efforts to halt the Iranian march toward a bomb.

The successful start up of Bushehr comes on the heels of an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report issued recently that gives voice to suspicions that the Iranian nuclear program has a secret military track that may be geared to develop an atomic warhead to place on one of Iran’s medium or long range missiles. And the start up of the reactor has been achieved despite the very clever and effective cyber attack using the Stuxnet worm last year.

There has been a history of trouble with the Bushehr reactor, going all the way back to the 1990s when the Russians contracted with the Iranian government to complete construction on the project, first begun by a German consortium for the Shah in the 1970s. Financial difficulties, the technical incompetence of Iranian subcontractors, political roadblocks, and problems with the fuel rods all contributed to the rocky road for the reactor.

The question with regards to how much of a threat the reactor poses has always been based on the reliability of the current agreements between the Iranian and Russian governments. Once up and running at full power, the plant will produce between 100 and 300 kilograms of plutonium a year – a by-product of spent fuel rods. Since as little as 6 kgs of plutonium is needed to build a bomb, the temptation for the Iranians to cheat will be great.

Whether they could get away with it is the nub of the matter. The Iranians have agreed that Moscow will supply Bushehr’s fuel rods and remove the spent fuel for shipment back to Russia where it will be de-processed. It will be very difficult to divert plutonium elsewhere as long as the Russians don’t deliberately look the other way. Also, the IAEA will be inspecting the plant regularly for safety concerns — a regime that includes keeping track of the fuel cycle at the plant.

This is the logic behind Bushehr being no “immediate” threat. But there are also legitimate concerns about Iran’s intentions with regard to the plant, and even some suspicion about Russia’s motives in selling and reprocessing the fuel rods.

Iran has threatened to withdraw from the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) several times. If they ever made good on those threats, activity at Bushehr would come under increased scrutiny. Within a few years, Iran will be technically capable of creating their own fuel rods, thus obviating the need for Moscow to supply them and consequently, removing the necessity for the Russians to remove them for reprocessing. With Iran in complete control of the nuclear fuel cycle, and no inspectors looking over their shoulder, the chance that the Iranians will take advantage of the situation is too great to ignore.

Source: http://frontpagemag.com/2011/05/20/irans-nuclear-program-revived/