Iran the loser, now and in years to come

The Arab uprisings could have been Iran’s greatest triumph. After all, revolutions in Islamic countries have a certain appeal to the mullah regime. But six months after the beginning of the protests, Tehran seems to be at a loss: Are the revolutions a good or a bad thing for the Islamic Republic? Nothing worked out quite as expected. And Iran’s Arab allies are struggling, too.

In January, the protests looked rather promising for the Iranian regime. Tehran’s traditional enemies, the pro-Western Sunni states, were facing major difficulties. After several weeks of demonstrations, one of Iran’s most outspoken critics was removed from the political scene: Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak. Officials in Tehran spoke of the regime change in Tunisia and Egypt as “Islamic revolutions” and even called them an “explosion of sacred anger” – a clear reference to their own Islamic revolution in 1979, which toppled the last shah, also a staunch Western ally.

Tehran’s interpretation of the Arab uprisings did not come as a surprise. Following the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the rise of Iraqi Shiites, many Sunni governments have come to fear a “Shiite crescent” under Tehran’s spell, reaching from Iraq, Syria, the Hezbollah-dominated parts of Southern Lebanon, Hamas’ statelet in Gaza to the Houthi strongholds in north-western Yemen. And they may have a reason for it: Iran, Syria, Hezbollah and Hamas have seen themselves as the “Axis of Resistance” against Israel and the Western influence in the Middle East.

This image has influenced the politics in many Arab capitals during the past few years. Most Arab states supported Lebanon’s “Cedar Revolution” following the assassination of former Sunni Prime Minister Rafik Al Hariri in 2005. The protests in Beirut ended the Syrian military presence in Lebanon. Some Sunni states hoped to bring down the regime of Bashar Al Assad, whose power base is the Alawite minority in Syria, which is usually seen as a Shiite sect.

The Sunni states also wanted to divide Damascus and Tehran. But developments in Iraq gave Tehran and Damascus a respite. The ascendancy of Iraq’s Shiites made most Arab governments nervous, especially the Gulf monarchies. In its aftermath and regardless of the anti-Shiite hatred of Osama Bin Laden, some Sunni analysts even saw a secret alliance between Tehran and Al Qaida.

When the Arab uprisings started, Tehran embraced the people’s anger. Iranian officials welcomed the revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt, and they expressed support for the people protesting in Yemen and in Libya. Even more important, however, was the issue of Bahrain. For many Iranians, Bahrain is a former Iranian province, which should be reunited with the Persian motherland – a position hardly any Bahraini supports.

Tehran and the Iranian media do not get tired of criticizing the West for not supporting democracy in Bahrain. The mullah regime calls for a majority rule in Bahrain – and that would mean a Shiite rule. This background and the polarization between Sunnis and Shiites in March played a major role in the Saudi-led GGC intervention in Bahrain, which was not only aimed at propping up the embattled Sunni monarchy but also intended to prevent Tehran from getting more than a foothold on the Arab side of the Gulf.

Not even American lobbying could stop the GCC intervention, which brought any hopes of democratization in Bahrain to an end.

But this was not the only disappointment the Arab uprisings had in stall for the Iranian hardliners. For more than 100 days, many Syrians have been in open revolt against the regime of Mr. Assad. Fearing to lose its only strong Arab ally, Tehran sent security personnel to Damascus to help his regime. After all, the Iranians acquired a lot of expertise when they crushed their own people’s uprising, so so-called green movement, after the widely falsified presidential elections in 2009.

This is the reason why – unlike in the case of Bahrain – the official Iranian news media do not call for freedom and democracy in Syria. Hezbollah, the main Shiite group in Lebanon, and their leader Hassan Nasrallah are echoing this position – a policy that has shattered their high moral standing in the eyes of most Arabs, which was the result of Hezbollah’s long fight with Israel.

Six months after the beginning of the Arab uprisings, Tehran does not look like a winner at all. The toppling of long-standing pro-Western leaders has not resulted in more allies for Iran. On the contrary: Saudi-Arabia and its GCC allies have started a counter-offensive; hopes for a Shiite Bahrain are doomed for now; and the closest Iranian allies in Syria and Lebanon, the Assad regime and the Hezbollah, are either fighting for their survival or are on the defensive.

In the long run, there is an even more serious threat for the Iranian theocracy. Many officials fear that the uprisings spread and revive the green movement, which might seriously threaten the clerical regime in Tehran and their allies in the security forces.

And all that at a time when there is a power struggle between the supreme leader in Iran, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and President Mahmud Ahmadinejad, which the latter seems to be losing. The next big bang might happen in Tehran but this time it may have nothing to do with Iran’s nuclear program.

Source: Al Arabiya English