Iranian influence will fall with Assad

Over the past few weeks, attention has increased regarding the increased possibility of an Israeli military strike on the Islamic Republic. There is little doubt that if such an event were to unfold it would have devastating repercussions for the Middle East. But with the Syrian uprising now in full swing, and the weight of the international community bearing down on the regime of Bashar Assad, you have another drama playing out in parallel that will powerfully transform the Middle Eastern landscape.

Syria is a crucial pivot point in the region; a linchpin state in the complex and interconnected system of “resistance” against Israel and the West, led by Iran. If the Assad regime were to go the way of those in Egypt, Tunisia and Libya, this entente, which was on a steep rise before the Arab revolutions, would likely begin to dissolve.

Iran will have lost its most trusted ally in the Arab world, leaving its regional strategy in tatters. A new Syria, ruled by a government much more representative of Sunnis and with possibly Islamist leanings, would probably not see eye-to-eye with Tehran’s Shiite mullahs. The suspicions and mistrust that underscore the Sunni-Shiite divide today would subvert the complicity that exists between Iran and Syria under the Assads.

Iran will also find itself more physically isolated from its main proxy, Hezbollah. This Lebanese Shiite militia would be forced to heavily re-evaluate its strategy. Damascus’s new Sunni leaders would naturally shift their support to their co-religionists in Lebanon, almost certainly at the expense of Hezbollah. A whole world of political and material support will have evaporated. The militia’s operations will be much more difficult without the helping hand of a sympathetic Syrian regime just across the border.

The collapse of the Assad regime would therefore mark the end of the halcyon days of the Tehran-Damascus nexus of resistance. The implications for Iran and the region are not minor: The new governments from Egypt, to Libya, to Syria will not be 100 per cent pro-western, but they certainly won’t be Iran’s closest friends. Their future political orientations are as yet unknown. What is known is that the people of the Middle East today want practical results, including dignity and respect — not just bluster and rhetoric. And certainly not war.

Therefore, the shock of the fall of yet another major tyrant in the Arab world will reverberate strongly. Egyptians, already dubious about the transitory military council running the country, will become even more steadfast in their protest for a faster transition to democracy.

Even the standing monarchies, which appear somewhat safe, will have to absorb this new shock wave and live with an enhanced anxiety regarding unexpected change. As the infectious desire for liberty gains new wind, the situation in Saudi Arabia, as opaque as ever to read, may well be affected. Jordanian King Abdullah’s comment that if he were in Assad’s shoes he would resign, may well come back to haunt him. At a minimum, the monarchies will become more serious and assiduous about reform.

Bashar Assad’s fall, if and when it comes, may well be the most significant event in the Middle East since the fall of Mubarak. This is especially so because the Syrian regime has been a flagship of autocratic rule in the region. For over four decades the Assads had achieved a depth of entrenchment, and a machinery of violence and repression, that make it one of the hardest nuts to crack in the Middle East. Its fall will send the signal that indeed the era of oppression and tyranny is over — a critical end-bracket to the revolutions of 2011.

The Middle East will be forever changed through this now seemingly inevitable event. But will Israel read it as a potential positive (the end of a resistance front)? Or will it adapt to the admittedly bewildering changes by a self-empowering act: a militaristic focus on Iran? The irony is that upcoming changes may, in themselves, diminish Iranian influence in the region, and Israel’s future relations with its “new” neighbours are not out of its control.

Given the importance of this shift, Israel must resist the temptation to pre-empt further unknowns by attempting to forestall this unfolding regional process. The democratization of the Arab world will certainly carry its own challenges and opportunities, but the dynamic should not be veered off course by another war involving Israel. The world must not let an attack on Iran overshadow, and spoil, this critical — and possibly imminent — development.

John Zada is a freelance writer based in Toronto who writes on Middle East politics, culture and travel. John Bell is director of the Middle East and Mediterranean Program at the Toledo International Centre for Peace in Madrid.

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