Hollande’s robust foreign policy at odds with domestic reticence

FT.com

The dispatch of some 1,000 soldiers to help a regional force quell bloody communal fighting in the Central African Republic follows the dramatic French intervention in Mali in January to prevent Islamist groups taking over the country.

Both have served as a clear statement of France’s continued willingness – notwithstanding a prolonged economic crisis at home – to use its military power on the international stage.

This muscular stance has extended to the Middle East. There was frustration in Paris in September when preparations for an armed strike on Syria had to be reined in at the last moment when President Barack Obama suddenly pulled the plug on US action.

Irritation over what was perceived as a sign of weakness in Washington no doubt informed the subsequent very public adoption by the socialist government of a hardline position in nuclear talks with Iran.

The contrast between President François Hollande’s tough foreign policy and his more reticent approach to France’s domestic economic problems has evoked much comment.

All the more so as Mr Hollande had a reputation when he won the presidency 18 months ago as a relatively untravelled leader who was a master of domestic politics but who had shown precious little engagement in international affairs.

But while Mr Hollande may have surprised with the robustness of his decision-making, his presidency has marked more of a continuity in foreign policy than a change.

His centre-right predecessor Nicolas Sarkozy had pursued similarly tough positions on Syria and Iran; he also played a leading role in the Nato military intervention in Libya in 2011 in which Mr Obama was content to “lead from behind”.

While France was pilloried in the US in 2003 for staying out of the US-led invasion of Iraq, it has pursued an assertive international role throughout the post-second world war period, anxious to preserve its position as a permanent member of the UN Security Council and one of the world’s leading military powers.

What is evident in current circumstances is a frustration, both in the limitations of that power and the perception that the US and France’s European partners are not fully susceptible to how Paris sees the world.

“The experience of Syria was perceived as a great failure, as it proved that France was unable to weigh on a major security crisis and that the US bypassed French opinion,” says Alexandra de Hoop Scheffer, director in Paris of the German Marshall Fund of the US.

In private, French officials have been expressing frustration for some time with the Obama administration. The strategic tilt by Mr Obama away from Europe towards Asia is the underlying cause of this.

Hubert Védrine, former foreign minister, says there is no fundamental disagreement between the US and France on Syria and Iran, despite recent spats, but there is “perplexity” over what the US president sees as the future of the transatlantic partnership.

From a French perspective, this highlights another frustration: the unwillingness of its EU allies to sign up to its longstanding vision of building an independent European defence capability.

The UK, France’s closest military partner, has never been interested and nor has Germany, its closest political partner, fully engaged. French officials barely disguise their disdain for the paucity of support from Berlin for operations such as Libya and Mali.

France, says Mr Védrine, needs to make “a realistic adjustment” to this gap, but also speak up louder in demanding support from Europe for UN-approved operations such as Mali.

But here another uncomfortable reality intrudes. The strength of France’s voice on the international stage depends in good part on its position as one of the world’s strongest economies.

In the longer term, Mr Hollande’s ability – at present much doubted – to restore the country’s economic prowess may matter more on its ability to project its influence than his current willingness to send French troops into the heart of darkness.