Stop Iran from getting the bomb

By Tyler Fredricks | November 5, 2014

Consensus rarely exists in politics. Elections that are decided by a 40 percent to 60 percent vote are considered a landslide. Yet, remarkably, when it comes to Iranian nuclear ambitions, such a consensus exists two-fold. On one hand, practically all players in American politics agree that under no circumstance can Iran obtain a nuclear weapon. On the other hand, practically all the political elite in the Islamic Republic of Iran agree that Iran cannot abandon its budding nuclear program. This is where we have a problem.

Iranian views typically espouse that the country has the right to enrichment. They also accurately point out that, to date, the United States is the only country to ever use a nuclear weapon in a time of war on civilians. In fact, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which is oftentimes viewed as the basis for Western intervention with the Iranian nuclear program, explicitly calls for states to have the right to peacefully use nuclear technology. Given these two arguments, one based in ideology and the other based on legal precedent, why is America, the P5+1 and the world so concerned with ensuring that Iran doesn’t get the bomb?

The answer to the former regarding the ideology that all countries have the right to enrichment and nuclear technology is clear—they don't. If there was no Manhattan project, no nuclear arms race during the Cold War and no nuclear proliferation, the world would be a safer place. By this I mean that there wouldn’t be a chance that one political miscalculation (not like that ever happens) could destroy our planet. Stopping nuclear proliferation and preventing rogue groups or unstable countries from attaining weapons of mass destruction is vital to ensuring global security.

Regarding the latter, the legal basis for permitting states to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, the key lies in the stipulations of the NPT. The caveat of the NPT is that certain regulations must be followed: countries have to follow the IAEA’s safety procedures and inspections. This is to ensure that nuclear energy is solely being used for peaceful purposes and so that the international community can monitor a country’s ‘breakout-time’—the amount of time at which a state can rush to enrich uranium/plutonium to get the bomb. This premise of accountability is crucial in the legal groundwork for establishing the right for countries to pursue a nuclear weapon.

Ok, so Iran violated its ratification of the NPT by not disclosing one of its enrichment plants. Or two. Or three. (Spoiler: It’s more than three). And Iran builds them underground, in mountains, under concrete reinforced bunkers. And it doesn’t cooperate with IAEA. I don’t know about you, but I smell somethin’ fishy.

But hey, Iran needs nuclear energy. It’s not like it produces over 5 percent of the world’s total crude oil. (Spoiler: It does). With petroleum accounting for 60 percent of the government’s revenues and its natural reserves ensuring the reliability of the country’s energy security and providing energy, the question must be asked: Why does Iran want a nuclear program? In the wake of crippling sanctions, global condemnations and the country becoming a virtual pariah, officials in the country remain determined to pursue its nuclear policy strictly for “peaceful purposes”.

Now I’m not a gambling man, but if I was, I would be willing to wager that Iran might have other ideas than supplying another few percentage points of its population with energy from a nuclear source.

Where were we?

In just a few days, November 9, the tripartite summit including the U.S., Iran and the European Union, will take place in Oman. A week after that the P5+1 will meet continuously until the deadline, November 24. Keep in mind that this deadline has already been extended from the previous deadline six months ago (along with the U.S. relinquishing some of its sanctions and allowing the Iranian economy to recover). I mentioned earlier that stopping Iran from getting the bomb is a consensus issue. If this is true, then why am I taking the time to write this editorial?

Because there is not a consensus in what this means. Stopping Iran from getting the bomb and stopping Iran from achieving a nuclear weapons capability (having a sufficiently shortened ‘breakout-time’) is not the same thing. By extending the previous deadline by 6 months, John Kerry and the US administration gave the Iranian economy ample time to recover. The struggling economy, thanks to globally endorsed sanctions, has led to widespread discontent with Iran’s regime (does anyone else remember the 2009 Iranian uprising that nobody did anything about?) and has actually caused real, legitimate pressure to the government. However, the easing of sanctions has allowed the economy to rebound and Iran has already signed several long-term contracts that are set to buoy its economy for a bit longer.

A good deal is one that removes Iran from the nuclear threshold in addition to preventing it from attaining a nuclear weapons capability. A bad deal is one that removes most of the economic sanctions and global pressure for receiving minimal guarantees and requirements on the Iranian nuclear program.

It’s weird that a goal with such unanimous American support leads to policy decisions and posturing that may very well allow one consensus opinion to be struck down and another to keep an autocratic regime in power.

Tyler Fredricks is a Trinity junior. His column runs every other Wednesday.