The last mile

NEGOTIATORS from six world powers (known as the P5+1) and Iran will gather this week in Vienna for a final push toward a deal to constrain the Islamic Republic’s nuclear programme before a selfimposed deadline of November 24th. The flurry of activity over the past few days suggests at least the possibility, if not the probability, of an historic breakthrough.

There were few public signs of progress in two days of bargaining in Oman last weekend between John Kerry, America’s secretary of state; Catherine Ashton, the European Union’s senior negotiator; and Muhammad Javad Zarif, Iran’s foreign minister. But an announcement on November 11th by Russia and Iran of a deal to build four new reactors at Bushehr, an existing Russian-built power station, and four at another site, hints at how each side could benefit. Iran retains an ambitious civilian nuclear programme; Russia gets influence and money; the West gets guarantees that Iran cannot get close to building an atomic bomb without great risk.

The details of the deal with Rosatom, Russia’s state-owned nuclear power company, remain obscure (and crucial). On the face of it, the accord provocatively prejudges the outcome of the talks. But a positive interpretation is that it was meant to facilitate a compromise on the central issue of the number of uranium-enrichment centrifuges Iran could keep.

With its growing stockpile of low-enriched uranium (LEU), currently 8.4 tonnes, and its 10,000 installed centrifuges Iran could spin enough fissile material for one bomb within a couple of months. But if the agreement with Rosatom means that Iran is willing to send (and keep on sending) nearly all its LEU to Russia for conversion to fuel rods, it might then be able to hold on to most of its operational centrifuges while still meeting the overriding requirement of the West’s negotiators—to push its “breakout capability” to nearly a year. This is because the fuel rods cannot easily be made into material for a bomb.

Mr Kerry and Sergei Lavrov, the Russian foreign minister, met on the fringes of the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation forum in Beijing three days before the Russia-Iran accord. Reportedly, Mr Kerry’s purpose was to gain Mr Lavrov’s confirmation that Russia would indeed take Iran’s LEU.

Still, possible progress on centrifuge numbers has done nothing to narrow differences over how sanctions would be eased after any deal. The Iranians want the UN Security Council sanctions to be among the first to go as that would symbolise the end of Iran’s pariah status. America and Europe think these should be among the last to be lifted. That is because if Iran cheats they would be harder to reimpose, almost certainly requiring a new vote at the UN that would give Russia a veto, than their own unilateral sanctions.

The Iranians are also perturbed that the Republican victory in America’s mid-term elections may make it harder for President Barack Obama to honour his side of a deal. Lindsey Graham, who is expected to hold a key Senate position, told a pro-Israel advocacy group on November 8th that he would “kill” anything he deemed to be a “bad deal”. This week he aims to introduce a bill, co-sponsored with Bob Corker, the incoming chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, that would force Mr Obama to subject a deal with Iran to congressional review. If there is no agreement with Iran, a further threat is the return of a bipartisan bill escalating sanctions.

Nor will there be any let-up in the campaign, much of it aimed at Congress, by Israel’s prime minister, Binyamin Netanyahu, to derail the possible deal. On November 10th he sent letters to the P5+1 foreign ministers warning them: “This terrorist regime in Iran must not be allowed to become a nuclear threshold power.” The next day, responding to leaks of a letter from Mr Obama to Ali Khamenei, Iran’s supreme leader, offering co-operation against Islamic State jihadists if a nuclear deal was concluded, Mr Netanyahu said: “Iran is not part of the solution; it is a huge part of the problem”. His warning was helpfully amplified by Mr Khamenei calling on Twitter for the “elimination” of Israel.

Mr Obama can probably offset congressional attempts to scupper a deal by waiving current sanctions using executive orders and vetoing any new bill. It would be up to his successor, assuming that Iran was honouring its commitments, to cajole Congress into a more permanent settlement. If Iran really wants a deal, it will have to accept Mr Obama’s assurances. If it does not, Senate hawks will provide a handy excuse for rejecting one. The hardliners on one side are the best friends of the hardliners on the other.