Iran’s Achilles’ Heel: Succession

Seldom has a state so economically weak been so triumphant on the world stage. Thanks in large part to President Obama’s strategic short-sightedness, Obama abandoned Iraq to dominant Iranian influence. Iran appears to be on the verge of snatching victory from the jaws of defeat in Syria, and Yemen is now firmly in the hands of an Iranian-backed militia. Western Afghanistan is also firmly under Iranian influence. Meanwhile, despite a half dozen UN Security Council Resolutions demanding Iran cease its nuclear enrichment program, the Islamic Republic appears on the verge of a deal that will allow it to continue, without adequate safeguards.

And while the Iranian economy had shrunk more than 5 percent in the year before nuclear negotiations began, the United States has unfrozen nearly $11 billion in Iranian assets simply to keep talks alive. To put that number in perspective, it’s about twice the official annual budget of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Whereas a decade ago, Iranian authorities referred to Iran as a regional power and then, beginning around 2011, a pan-regional power (to include not only the Persian Gulf but also the Northern Indian Ocean), Iranian regime officials and senior IRGC commanders talk about the Eastern Mediterranean and North Africa as Iran’s “strategic boundaries.”

Not all is saffron and roses for the Islamic Republic, however. Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei is 75 years old, and has recently had some health scares. Even if he is fully recovered now, Septuagenarians tend to have limited lifespans. So what happens after Khamenei passes?

Iran isn’t Saudi Arabia, where a crown prince takes over, or a Syria-style Arab republic where son succeeds father. In theory, an 86-member clerical body called the Assembly of Experts chooses Khamenei’s successor, but the only time when they have theoretically selected a new leader was in 1989 when revolutionary leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini passed away. At the time, Iran’s leading powerbrokers selected the relatively bland and unaccomplished Khamenei as a compromise candidate and only then submitted his name to the Assembly for its rubber stamp. The idea that the Assembly of Experts will smoothly choose a successor after Khamenei dies is probably unwarranted.

Iran is far from a democracy: Khamenei is a master marionette who plays the different factions off each other: It is no coincidence that hardliners and reformers alternate the presidency, or that Ministry of Intelligence veterans supplant IRGC officers in key ministries. Once one group gets too powerful, Khamenei simply cuts the powerful down to size and allows their competitors to rise up.

But once he’s gone, the finger will come out of the dyke. Every faction will battle for primacy. Because the supreme leader is the unquestioned dictator, the stakes couldn’t be higher. Iran could be looking at months without clear leadership, a dangerous time in which the IRGC might simply assume greater power by reason of being the best armed. Of course, it is theoretically possible that the “Guardianship of the Jurisprudent” will be occupied by a committee if informal consensus is not possible. This might seem like a short-term compromise, but it is a recipe for instability, as the leadership body simply becomes ground zero for increasingly virulent factional struggles.

Obama’s strategy focuses on the here and now, and he is ceding vast tracks of territory to Iran’s predominant influence. If he believes this can bring about security, however, he may be disastrously wrong. The problem with the idea that dictatorships breed stability is the fact that autocrats are not immortal, especially ill, frail, 75-year-old dictators.

Michael Rubin